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Abstract
In this two-part paper, we consider the problem of secure network coding when the information rate
and the security level can change over time. To efficiently solve this problem, we put forward local-
encoding-preserving secure network coding, where a family of secure linear network codes (SLNCs) is
called local-encoding-preserving if all the SLNCs in this family share a common local encoding kernel
at each intermediate node in the network. In the current paper (i.e., Part II of the two-part paper), we
first consider the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed rate and a flexible
security level. We present a novel and efficient approach for constructing upon an SLNC that exists a
local-encoding-preserving SLNC with the same rate and the security level increased by one. Next, we
consider the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed dimension (equal to
the sum of rate and security level) and a flexible pair of rate and security level. We propose another
novel approach for designing an SLNC such that the same SLNC can be applied for all the rate and
security-level pairs with the fixed dimension. Also, two polynomial-time algorithms are developed for
efficient implementations of the two proposed approaches, respectively. Furthermore, we prove that both
approaches do not incur any penalty on the required field size for the existence of SLNCs in terms of the
best known lower bound by Guang and Yeung. Finally, we consider the ultimate problem of designing a
family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs that can be applied to all possible pairs of rate and security
level. By combining the construction of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed security
level and a flexible rate (which has been obtained in Part I [1]) with the constructions of the two families
of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs in the current paper in suitable ways, we can obtain a family of
local-encoding-preserving SLNCs that can be applied for all possible pairs of rate and security level.
Three possible such constructions are presented.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Part I [1] of this two-part paper, in a secure network coding system, the requirements
for information transmission and information security may vary, and so the information rate and the
security level of the system may need to be chosen differently at different times. Thus we are motivated
to put forward local-encoding-preserving secure network coding, where a family of secure linear network
codes (SLNCs) is called local-encoding-preserving if all the SLNCs in this family share a common local
encoding kernel at each intermediate node in the network. In other words, regardless of which SLNC
in this family to be used, the same local encoding kernel at each intermediate node is applied for local
encoding. Further, we considered the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed
security level and a flexible rate. Specifically, we proposed an approach to constructing a family of local-
encoding-preserving SLNCs with a fixed security level r (0 ≤ r ≤ Cmin) and multiple rates from 0 to
Cmin−r, the allowed maximum rate, where Cmin is the smallest minimum cut capacity between the source
node and the sink nodes. We also developed a polynomial-time algorithm for efficient implementation of
our approach. Furthermore, it was proved that our approach does not incur any penalty on the required
field size for the existence of SLNCs in terms of the best known lower bound in [2].
In the current paper (i.e., Part II of the two-part paper), we continue the studies in Part I by considering
the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed rate and a flexible security level.
Our approach is totally different from all the previous approaches used in related problems (including
the approach in Part I) [1], [3], [4]. Upon an SLNC that exists, we construct a local-encoding-preserving
SLNC with the same rate and at one security level higher, which leads to an increase of the code
dimension (equal to the sum of rate and security level). In contrast, in all the previous approaches, the
dimension of the newly constructed linear network code decreases.
Specifically, we start with an SLNC with the required rate, denoted by ω, and the security level 0 (which
in fact is an ω-dimensional linear network code), and apply the proposed approach repeatedly. As such,
we can obtain a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the fixed rate ω and multiple security
levels from 0 to Cmin − ω, the allowed maximum security level. Based on this approach, we further
develop a polynomial-time algorithm for efficient implementation. Also, we prove that our approach
incurs no penalty (even better for some cases) on the required field size for the existence of SLNCs in
terms of the best known lower bound [2].
Next, we consider the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed dimension
and a flexible pair of rate and security level, i.e., all rate and security-level pairs such that the sum of the
rate and the security level is equal to a constant. Toward this end, we use another novel approach to design
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3an SLNC such that with the same SLNC, all the rate and security-level pairs with the fixed dimension
are applicable. With this approach, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm for the construction of such
an SLNC. Again, for our approach, there is no penalty on the field size of the existence of SLNCs in
terms of the best known lower bound [2].
Finally, we consider the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs which can be applied
to all possible pairs of rate and security level, i.e., all the nonnegative integer pairs (ω, r) of rate ω
and security level r with ω + r ≤ Cmin. The set of all such the pairs forms the rate and security-level
region. By combining the constructions of the 3 families of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs in Part I
and Part II in suitable ways, we can construct a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving
all the pairs in the rate and security-level region. Three possible such constructions are presented.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we present secure network coding and
the preliminaries, and introduce the necessary definitions and a proposition. In Sections III and IV, we
design a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed rate and a flexible security level, and a
family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed dimension and a flexible rate and security-level
pair. Section V is devoted to the design of a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving all
the pairs in the rate and security-level region. We conclude in Section VI with a summary of our results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For the completeness of this paper, in this section we briefly present secure network coding and
introduce the necessary notation and definitions. We refer the reader to Section II of Part I [1] of the
current paper for more details.
We consider a finite directed acyclic network G = (V,E) with a single source s and a set of sink
nodes T ⊆ V \ {s}, where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of G. For a directed edge e
from node u to node v, the node u is called the tail of e and the node v is called the head of e, denoted
by tail(e) and head(e), respectively. Further, for a node u, let In(u) = {e ∈ E : head(e) = u} and
Out(u) = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = u}. Without loss of generality, assume that there are no incoming edges for
the source node s and no outgoing edges for any sink node t ∈ T . For convenience sake, however, we let
In(s) be a set of n imaginary incoming edges, denoted by di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, terminating at the source node s
but without tail nodes, where the nonnegative integer n is equal to the dimension of the network code in
discussion. This will become clear later (see Definition 1). Then, we see that In(s) =
{
di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
.
An index taken from an alphabet can be transmitted on each edge e in E. In other words, the capacity
of each edge is taken to be 1. Parallel edges between two adjacent nodes are allowed.
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4In a network G, a cut between the source node s and a non-source node t is defined as a set of edges
whose removal disconnects s from t. The capacity of a cut between s and t is defined as the number of
edges in the cut, and the minimum of the capacities of all the cuts between s and t is called the minimum
cut capacity between them, denoted by Ct. A cut between s and t is called a minimum cut if its capacity
achieves the minimum cut capacity between them. These concepts can be extended from a non-source
node t to an edge subset A of E (cf. [1, Section II-A]).
It has been shown in [5], [6] that linear network coding over a finite field is sufficient for achieving
Cmin , mint∈T Ct, the theoretical maximum information rate for multicast [7]. The formal definition of
a linear network code is given as follows.
Definition 1. Let Fq be a finite field of order q, where q is a prime power, and n be a nonnegative
integer. An n-dimensional Fq-valued linear network code Cn on the network G = (V,E) consists of an
Fq-valued |In(v)| × |Out(v)| matrix Kv = [kd,e]d∈In(v),e∈Out(v) for each non-sink node v in V , i.e.,
Cn =
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
,
where Kv is called the local encoding kernel of Cn at v, and kd,e ∈ Fq is called the local encoding
coefficient for the adjacent edge pair (d, e).
For a linear network code Cn, the local encoding kernels Kv at all the non-sink nodes v ∈ V \ T
induce an n-dimensional column vector ~f
(n)
e for each edge e in E, called the global encoding kernel
of e, which can be calculated recursively according to a given ancestral order of edges in E by
~f (n)e =
∑
d∈In(tail(e))
kd,e · ~f
(n)
d , (1)
with the boundary condition that ~f
(n)
d , d ∈ In(s) form the standard basis of the vector space F
n
q . The
set of global encoding kernels for all e ∈ E, i.e.,
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
, is also used to represent this linear
network code Cn. However, we remark that a set of global encoding kernels
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
may
correspond to more than one set of local encoding kernels
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
.
In using of this linear network code Cn, let x =
(
x1 x2 · · · xn
)
∈ Fnq be the input of the source
node s. We assume that the input x is transmitted to s through the n imaginary incoming channels of the
source node s. Without loss of generality, xi is transmitted on the ith imaginary channel di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For each edge e ∈ E, we use ye to denote the message transmitted on e. Then ye can be calculated
recursively by the equation
ye =
∑
d∈In(tail(e))
kd,e · yd (2)
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5according to the given ancestral order of edges in E, with ydi , xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We see that ye in fact is
a linear combination of the n symbols xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of x. It is readily seen that ydi = x ·
~f
(n)
di
(= xi),
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then it can be shown by induction via (1) and (2) that
ye = x · ~f
(n)
e , ∀ e ∈ E. (3)
Furthermore, for each sink node t ∈ T , we define the matrix F
(n)
t =
[
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ In(t)
]
. The sink node t
can decode the source message with zero error if and only if F
(n)
t is full rank, i.e., Rank
(
F
(n)
t
)
= n.
We say that an n-dimensional linear network code Cn is decodable if for each sink node t in T , the rank
of the matrix F
(n)
t is equal to the dimension n of the code. Next, we present the transformation of a
linear network code.
Proposition 1 ([1, Theorem 1]). Let Cn =
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
be an n-dimensional decodable linear
network code over a finite field Fq on the network G = (V,E), of which the global encoding kernels
are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. Let Q be an m× n (m ≤ n) matrix over Fq and Q · Cn =
{
K
(Q)
v : v ∈ V \ T
}
with
K
(Q)
s = Q ·Ks and K
(Q)
v = Kv for all v ∈ V \({s}∪T ). Then Q ·Cn is an m-dimensional linear network
code over Fq on G, of which the global encoding kernels are Q · ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. This linear network code
Q · Cn is called the transformation of Cn by the matrix Q. In particular, Q · Cn is decodable provided
that Q is full row rank, i.e., Rank
(
Q
)
= m.
Now, we present the secure network coding model. The source node s generates a random source
message M taking values in the message set Fωq according to the uniform distribution, where the
nonnegative integer ω is called the information rate. The source message M needs to be multicast
to each sink node t ∈ T , while being protected from a wiretapper who can access one but not more than
one arbitrary edge subset of size at most r, where the nonnegative integer r is called the security level.
The network G with a required security level r is called an r-wiretap network. To combat the wiretapper
in our wiretap network model, a random key generated at the source node is used to randomize the source
message. This key is a random variable K taking values in a set of keys Frq according to the uniform
distribution.
We now consider a secure linear network code (SLNC) on an r-wiretap network G. Let n = ω + r,
the sum of the information rate ω and the security level r. An Fq-valued n-dimensional SLNC on the
r-wiretap network G is an Fq-valued n-dimensional linear network on G such that the following are
satisfied:
• decoding condition: every sink node is able to decode the source message M with zero error;
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6• security condition: I(YA;M) = 0,
1 ∀ A ⊆ E with |A| ≤ r, where we denote by Ye the random
variable transmitted on the edge e that is a linear function of the random source message M and
the random key K, and denote (Ye : e ∈ A) by YA for a subset A ⊆ E.
The nonnegative integers ω and r are also referred to as the information rate and security level of the
SLNC, respectively. When r = 0, the secure network coding model reduces to the original network
coding model.
Next, we specify a construction of SLNCs which will be used subsequently. Before specifying this
code construction, we need several graph-theoretic concepts. By applying these concepts, the required
field size for the existence of SLNCs can be reduced significantly. Let A ⊆ E be an edge subset. A
minimum cut between s and A is primary if it separates s and all the minimum cuts between s and A.
Such a primary minimum cut is unique and can be found in polynomial time [2]. Furthermore, we say
an edge subset is primary if this edge subset itself is its primary minimum cut from s. We use Ar to
denote the set of primary edge subsets of size r, i.e.,
Ar =
{
A ⊆ E : A is primary and |A| = r
}
.2
Guang and Yeung [2] showed that |Ar| is an improved lower bound on the field size for the existence
of SLNCs, and the improvement can be significant.
Now, we present the construction of SLNCs of Cai and Yeung [8]. Let ω and r be the information rate
and the security level, respectively, and n , ω + r ≤ Cmin. Let Cn be an n-dimensional linear network
code with global encoding kernels ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E over a finite field Fq on the network G. Let ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 ,
· · · , ~b
(n)
ω be ω linearly independent column vectors in Fnq such that〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar. (4)
Let ~b
(n)
ω+1,
~b
(n)
ω+2, · · · ,
~b
(n)
n be another n − ω column vectors in Fnq such that the total n vectors
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
n are linearly independent, and let Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
. Then, (Q(n))−1 · Cn, the
transformation of Cn by (Q
(n))−1 (cf. Proposition 1), is an n-dimensional SLNC of information rate ω
and security level r. In using the SLNC (Q(n))−1 · Cn, we let m, a row ω-vector in F
ω
q , be the value of
the source messageM , and k, a row r-vector in Frq, be the value of the random key K. Then x =
(
m k
)
is the input of the source node s. With this setting, it was proved in [8] that this coding scheme not only
multicasts the source message M to all the sink nodes at rate ω but also achieves security level r.
1Here, I(YA;M) denotes the mutual information between YA and M .
2We refer the reader to Example 1 in Section III-B for illustrations of Ar .
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In this section, we consider the problem of designing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for
a fixed information rate and multiple security levels. First, we present the following lemma that shows
the existence of a family of local-encoding-preserving decodable linear network codes in which the linear
network codes have distinct dimensions.
Lemma 1. Let CCmin =
{
~f
(Cmin)
e : e ∈ E
}
be a Cmin-dimensional decodable linear network code over
the finite field Fq on the network G = (V,E), where Cmin = mint∈T Ct. Let
Cn =
[
In 0
]
· CCmin =
{
~f (n)e ,
[
In 0
]
· ~f (Cmin)e : e ∈ E
}
, 1 ≤ n ≤ Cmin,
where we use 0 in bold face to stand for an all-zero matrix of size n× (Cmin − n) and thus ~f
(n)
e is the
sub-vector of ~f
(Cmin)
e containing the first n components. Then,
{
Cn : n = 1, 2, · · · , Cmin
}
constitute a
family of decodable linear network codes over Fq on G with dimensions from 1 to Cmin, and have the
same local encoding kernels at the non-source nodes.
Proof: This lemma can be proved straightforwardly by involving Corollary 2 in [1], in which we
take the column vector ~ℓ to be the all-zero column vector ~0 repeatedly with appropriate dimension.
Based on the SLNC construction at the end of Section II and Lemma 1, we naturally put forward the
following approach for constructing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs of the same information
rate ω and security levels from 0 to Cmin − ω. First, we apply Lemma 1 to obtain a family of local-
encoding-preserving linear network codes
{
Cn : n = ω, ω + 1, · · · , Cmin
}
of dimensions from ω to
Cmin. Next, for each n-dimensional linear network code Cn, we let r = n − ω and design an n × n
invertible matrix Q(n) satisfying (4). Then, we construct a family of SLNCs
{
(Q(n))−1 · Cn : n =
ω, ω + 1, · · · , Cmin
}
, which have the same rate ω and different security levels from 0 to Cmin − ω.
However, the above approach not only requires the construction of the matrix Q(n) for each n, incurring
a high computational complexity, but also requires the source node s to store all the matrices Q(n).3 To
avoid these shortcomings, we put forward the following more efficient approach to solve this problem.
A. Approach and Technique
We first present the following lemma which is instrumental to our approach.
3 The computational complexity of the construction of Q(n) is shown to be O
(
ωn3|Ar|+ ωn|Ar|
2 + rn2
)
in Appendix A
in [1], and the storage cost is O
(
n2
)
.
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8Lemma 2. Let ω and r be the information rate and the security level, respectively, and let n = ω + r.
Consider an n-dimensional linear network code Cn =
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
over a finite field Fq on the
network G, and an n× n invertible matrix Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
over Fq. Then, (Q
(n))−1 · Cn
is a rate-ω and security-level-r SLNC over Fq on G if and only if (4) is satisfied, i.e.,〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar.
In order to prove Lemma 2, we need the following lemma. Before stating this lemma, we first let
B
(n)
j =
〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ j
〉
and L
(n)
A =
〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
for any j ≤ n ≤ Cmin and any A ⊆ E.
Lemma 3. Let ω and r be the information rate and the security level, respectively, and let n = ω + r.
Consider an n-dimensional linear network code Cn =
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
over a finite field Fq on the
network G and ω linearly independent column n-vectors ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω . Then,
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar (5)
if and only if
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ Er, (6)
where Er is the set of the edge subsets of size not larger than r, i.e., Er = {A ⊆ E : |A| ≤ r}.
Proof: The “if” part is evident since Ar ⊆ Er. We prove the “only if” part in the following. Consider
an arbitrary wiretap set A in Er (not necessarily regular) and a minimum cut CUTA between s and A.
Clearly, this minimum cut CUTA is regular and |CUTA| ≤ r. Since r ≤ n ≤ Cmin, we can choose
another r′ , r− |CUTA| edges e1, e2, · · · , er′ such that the edge subset B , CUTA
⋃
{e1, e2, · · · , er′}
is regular. Let B′ be the primary minimum cut between s and B, which, together with |B| = r, implies
that B′ is primary and |B′| = r. We thus obtain that the wiretap set A in Er is separated by the primary
edge subset B′ in Ar from s. It follows from the mechanism of network coding that〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
⊆
〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ B
′
〉
,
which, together with (5) implies that
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A = {
~0}.
The lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 2: The “if” part can be proved immediately by combining Lemma 3 with the proof
of Theorem 2 in [8] (cf. [8, Section V]). So, it suffices to prove the “only if” part. In fact, Remark 1
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9in [8] gives an intuitive explanation about the “only if” part. In the following, we will give a rigorous
proof.
Let Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
be an n× n invertible matrix over Fq such that (Q
(n))−1 · Cn is a
rate-ω and security-level-r SLNC over Fq on G. Assume the contrary that there exists a nonzero column
n-vector ~v such that ~v ∈
〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈~f (n)e : e ∈ A〉 for some wiretap subset A in Ar. Then
there exist α1, α2, · · · , αω in Fq, not all zero, such that
~v =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i , (7)
and another r elements in Fq, denoted by βe, e ∈ A, which are not all zero, such that
~v =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e . (8)
Combining (7) and (8), we have
~v =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i . (9)
With the invertibility of the matrix Q(n), the equality (9) is equivalent to the following:
~0 6= ~v ′ , (Q(n))−1 · ~v =
∑
e∈A
βe · (Q
(n))−1 · ~f (n)e =
ω∑
i=1
αi · (Q
(n))−1 ·~b
(n)
i =
ω∑
i=1
αi~1
(n)
i , (10)
where we note that (Q(n))−1 ·~b
(n)
i =
~1
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, with
~1
(n)
i being the n-column indicator vector of
the ith component. Let ~v ′ =
(
v′1, v
′
2, · · · , v
′
n
)
. By (10), we obtain
v′ω+1 = v
′
ω+2 = · · · = v
′
n = 0. (11)
Now, we consider an arbitrary row ω-vector m in Fωq and an arbitrary row r-vector k in F
r
q. Together
with (11), we have(
m k
)
· ~v ′ =
(
m k
) ω∑
i=1
αi~1
(n)
i =
(
m k
)∑
e∈A
βe · (Q
(n))−1 · ~f (n)e
=
∑
e∈A
βe ·
[(
m k
)
· (Q(n))−1 · ~f (n)e
]
=
∑
e∈A
βe · ye, (12)
where ye in Fq is the message transmitted in the edge e when the source message M and the random
key K takes the values m and k, respectively.
Combining (11) and (12), we thus obtain(
m k
)
· ~v ′ = m ·
(
v′1 v
′
2 · · · v
′
ω
)⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βe · ye. (13)
In other words, the effects of the random key K on the messages transmitted on the edges in A can be
removed by taking a linear combination of these messages. Also, we see from the second equality above
that for any given set of messages transmitted on the edges in A, the source message m is constrained.
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Next, we calculate the conditional probability Pr
(
M = m|YA = yA), where YA = (Ye, e ∈ A) and
yA = (ye, e ∈ A). We first let FA =
[
(Q(n))−1 · ~f
(n)
e : e ∈ A
]
, so that(
m k
)
· FA = yA. (14)
Then
Pr
(
M = m|YA = yA)
=
Pr
(
M = m, YA = yA)
Pr
(
YA = yA)
=
∑
k′∈Frq
Pr
(
M = m, K = k′, YA = yA)
Pr
(
YA = yA)
=
∑
k′∈Frq
Pr
(
YA = yA|M = m, K = k
′) · Pr
(
M = m, K = k′)
Pr
(
YA = yA)
=
∑
k′∈Frq s.t. (m k
′)·FA=yA
1 · Pr
(
M = m, K = k′)∑
(m′ k′)∈Fnq s.t.
(m′ k′)·FA=yA
Pr
(
YA = yA|M = m′, K = k′) · Pr
(
M = m′, K = k′)
=
∑
k′∈Frq s.t. (m k
′)·FA=yA
Pr
(
M = m, K = k′)∑
(m′ k′)∈Fnq s.t.
(m′ k′)·FA=yA
Pr
(
M = m′, K = k′)
=
#
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : (m k
′) · FA = yA
}
#
{
(m′ k′) ∈ Fnq : (m
′ k′) · FA = yA
} , (15)
where we use “#{·}” to stand for the cardinality of the set, and the last equality (15) holds because M
and K are independent and uniformly distributed over Fωq and F
r
q, respectively.
We further write
FA =
FA,ω
FA,r
 , (16)
where FA,ω is the sub-matrix containing the first ω row vectors of FA, and FA,r is the one containing
the remaining r row vectors of FA. With (16), we have
#
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : (m k
′) · FA = yA
}
= #
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : k
′FA,r = yA −mFA,ω
}
= qr−Rank(FA,r), (17)
where the last equality holds since there exists a solution k′ (e.g., k by (14)) for the equation k′FA,r =
yA −mFA,ω.
Furthermore, since we have proved that the equality (13) holds for all pairs (m k) of m ∈ Fωq and
k ∈ Frq satisfying (14), we obtain that
#
{
(m′ k′) ∈ Fnq : (m
′
k
′) · FA = yA
}
November 9, 2018
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= #
{
(m′ k′) ∈ Fnq : (m
′
k
′) · FA = yA and m
′ ·
(
v′1 v
′
2 · · · v
′
ω
)⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
}
= #
⋃
m
′∈Fωq s.t.
m′·
(
v′1 v
′
2 ··· v
′
ω
)
⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
{
(m′ k′) ∈ Fnq : (m
′
k
′) · FA = yA
}
=
∑
m
′∈Fωq s.t.
m
′·
(
v′1 v
′
2 ··· v
′
ω
)
⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
#
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : (m
′
k
′) · FA = yA
}
=
∑
m′∈Fωq s.t.
m
′·
(
v′1 v
′
2 ··· v
′
ω
)
⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
#
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : k
′FA,r = yA −m
′FA,ω
}
≤
∑
m′∈Fωq s.t.
m′·
(
v′1 v
′
2 ··· v
′
ω
)
⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
qr−Rank(FA,r) (18)
= #
{
m
′ ∈ Fωq : m
′ ·
(
v′1 v
′
2 · · · v
′
ω
)⊤
=
∑
e∈A
βeye
}
· qr−Rank(FA,r)
= qω−1 · qr−Rank(FA,r), (19)
where the inequality (18) follows from the fact that for the given m′ ∈ Fωq ,
#
{
k
′ ∈ Frq : k
′FA,r = yA −m
′FA,ω
}
=
q
r−Rank(FA,r), if k′FA,r = yA −m
′FA,ω has a solution,
0, otherwise.
Substituting (17) and (19) into (15), we immediately prove that
Pr
(
M = m|YA = yA) ≥
1
qω−1
.
Hence,
Pr
(
M = m|YA = yA) 6= Pr
(
M = m
)
=
1
qω
,
a contradiction to H(M) = H(M |YA), namely that the SLNC (Q
(n))−1 · Cn achieves the security level r.
The lemma is proved.
Let CCmin =
{
~f
(Cmin)
e : e ∈ E
}
be a Cmin-dimensional linear network code over Fq on the network
G. Let ω be the fixed information rate. By Lemma 1,
Cn =
{
~f (n)e ,
[
In 0
]
· ~f (Cmin)e : e ∈ E
}
, 4 n = ω, ω + 1, · · · , Cmin
constitute a family of local-encoding-preserving linear network codes with dimensions from ω to Cmin.
Note that Cω can be regarded as an ω-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level 0. Further, for any
4Here, 0 in bold face stands for an all-zero matrix of size n× (Cmin − n).
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ω×ω invertible matrix Q(ω) =
[
~b
(ω)
1
~b
(ω)
2 · · ·
~b
(ω)
ω
]
, it follows from Proposition 1 that (Q(ω))−1 · Cω
also is an ω-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level 0.
Now, consider any n-dimensional (ω ≤ n ≤ Cmin − 1) SLNC (Q
(n))−1 · Cn with the fixed rate ω
and security level r , n − ω, where we write Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
. By Lemma 2, this is
equivalent to that Q(n) is an n× n invertible matrix satisfying〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar.
Based on the SLNC (Q(n))−1 · Cn, we will construct an (n+1)-dimensional SLNC (Q
(n+1))−1 · Cn+1 with
rate ω and security level r+1. Our idea is to design an appropriate row ω-vector ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
∈ Fωq
to obtain ω column (n + 1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i ,
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, such that ~b (n+1)i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are
linearly independent, and〈
~b
(n+1)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n+1)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar+1.
Then with ~b
(n+1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, we construct another n + 1 − ω column (n + 1)-vectors
~b
(n+1)
ω+1 ,
~b
(n+1)
ω+2 ,
· · · , ~b
(n+1)
n+1 such that
[
~b
(n+1)
1
~b
(n+1)
2 · · ·
~b
(n+1)
n+1
]
, denoted by Q(n+1), is an (n+1)× (n+1) invertible
matrix. In this way, we can construct an (n+1)-dimensional SLNC (Q(n+1))−1 ·Cn+1 that retains the fixed
rate ω, achieves a higher security level r + 1, and has the same local encoding kernels as (Q(n))−1 · Cn
at all the non-source nodes by Proposition 1.
Next, we will design such an appropriate vector ~c, which is the crucial to our proposed approach.
Based on Cn, we partition Ar+1 into two disjoint subsets:
A˜
′
r+1 =
{
A ∈ Ar+1 : ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly dependent
}
, (20)
A˜
′′
r+1 =
{
A ∈ Ar+1 : ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent
}
. (21)
Lemma 4. For A˜ ′r+1 and A˜
′′
r+1,
A˜
′
r+1 =
{
A ∈ Ar+1 : B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A = {
~0}
}
, (22)
and
A˜
′′
r+1 =
{
A ∈ Ar+1 : B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}
}
. (23)
Proof: It suffices to prove that for any A ∈ Ar+1, the vectors ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent
if and only if B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}. For the “only if” part, since ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent, we
have dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
= r + 1. Thus,
dim
(
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A
)
= dim
(
B(n)ω
)
+ dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
− dim
(
B(n)ω + L
(n)
A
)
≥ ω + (r + 1)− n = 1,
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where the inequality follows from dim
(
B
(n)
ω + L
(n)
A
)
≤ n = ω + r. This implies B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}.
For the “if” part, we let A′ ⊆ A such that
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ A′
}
is a maximal linearly independent subset
of
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ A
}
. Then, we have
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A′ = B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}. (24)
This immediately implies A′ = A, because otherwise |A′| ≤ r, which together with B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A′ 6= {
~0}
in (24), contradicts to (6) and thus (5) by Lemma 3. Therefore, ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A are linearly independent.
The lemma is proved.
We first consider those wiretap sets in A˜ ′r+1. The following theorem asserts that any vector ~c ∈ F
ω
q is
feasible for the wiretap sets in A˜ ′r+1.
Theorem 5. For any row ω-vector ~c = (c1 c2 · · · cω) ∈ F
ω
q , the following are satisfied:
• the column (n+ 1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent;
• B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ A˜ ′r+1.
Proof: First, we note that the column n-vectors ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent, and so
are the column (n+ 1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω.
Next, we prove by contradiction that for any ~c = (c1 c2 · · · cω) ∈ F
ω
q ,
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ A˜ ′r+1.
Assume that there exists an edge subset A ∈ A˜ ′r+1 such that B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A 6= {
~0}, and let ~v (n+1) =[
v1 v2 · · · vn+1
]⊤
be a nonzero vector in B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A . Then, there exist α1, α2, · · · , αω in Fq,
not all zero, such that
~v (n+1) =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n+1)
i , (25)
and another r + 1 elements in Fq, denoted by βe, e ∈ A, which are not all zero, such that
~v (n+1) =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n+1)
e . (26)
We further write (25) and (26) respectively as~v (n)
vn+1
 = ω∑
i=1
αi
~b (n)i
ci
 , (27)
and ~v (n)
vn+1
 =∑
e∈A
βe
 ~f (n)e
fe,n+1
 , (28)
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where ~v (n) is the sub-vector of ~v (n+1) obtained by deleting the last component vn+1, i.e., ~v
(n) =[
v1 v2 · · · vn
]⊤
, and fe,n+1 is the last component of ~f
(n+1)
e . Combining (27) and (28), we immediately
obtain
~v (n) =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e ,
which implies ~v (n) ∈ B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A . On the other hand, since
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω are linearly independent,
and α1, α2, · · · , αω are not all zero, we immediately have ~v
(n) 6= ~0, implying that B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that A ∈ A˜ ′r+1 (cf. (22) in Lemma 4). The theorem is proved.
Next, we consider the vectors ~c ∈ Fωq that are feasible for the wiretap sets in A˜
′′
r+1. We first prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 6. For any edge subset A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, dim
(
B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A
)
= 1.
Proof: Let A be an arbitrary edge subset in A˜ ′′r+1. By (23) in Lemma 4, we assume that there exist
two linearly independent vectors ~v
(n)
1 and ~v
(n)
2 in B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A . Then, there exist (α1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω) and
(α2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω) in F
ω
q , and (β1,e, e ∈ A) and (β2,e, e ∈ A) in F
r+1
q such that
~v
(n)
1 =
ω∑
i=1
α1,i~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
β1,e ~f
(n)
e , (29)
and
~v
(n)
2 =
ω∑
i=1
α2,i~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
β2,e ~f
(n)
e . (30)
The linear independence of ~v
(n)
1 and ~v
(n)
2 implies that both of them are nonzero. Together with the
linear independence of ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω , we obtain that (α1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω) and (α2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω) are
nonzero vectors.
Next, we prove that β1,e, e ∈ A are all nonzero. Assume otherwise, i.e., β1,e′ = 0 for some e
′ ∈ A.
Then, by (29) we have
~0 6= ~v
(n)
1 ∈ B
(n)
ω
⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A \ {e
′}
〉
= B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A\{e′}. (31)
We further note that the edge subset A \ {e′} has cardinality r, implying that A \ {e′} ∈ Er. This is
a contradiction to B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
B = {
~0} for all B ∈ Er, which follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 because
(Q(n))−1 · Cn is an n-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level r. Thus, β1,e, e ∈ A are all
nonzero. Likewise, β2,e, e ∈ A are all nonzero.
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Fix any e′′ ∈ A. Then β1,e′′ and β2,e′′ are both nonzero. Let γ = −β1,e′′/β2,e′′ which is a nonzero
element in Fq. Then
β1,e′′ + γβ2,e′′ = 0. (32)
On the other hand, ~v
(n)
1 + γ~v
(n)
2 6= ~0 because ~v
(n)
1 and ~v
(n)
2 are linearly independent. By (29) and (30),
we obtain
~v
(n)
1 + γ~v
(n)
2 =
ω∑
i=1
(α1,i + γα2,i)~b
(n)
i
=
∑
e∈A
(β1,e + γβ2,e)~f
(n)
e
=
∑
e∈A\{e′′}
(β1,e + γβ2,e)~f
(n)
e ,
where the last equality follows from (32).
Therefore, the nonzero vector ~v
(n)
1 + γ~v
(n)
2 is in B
(n)
ω
⋂〈~f (n)e : e ∈ A \ {e′′}〉 = B(n)ω ⋂L(n)A\{e′′},
which implies
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A\{e′′} 6= {
~0}.
By the same argument following (31), this contradicts B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
B = {
~0} for all B ∈ Er. Thus we have
proved that there cannot exist ~v
(n)
1 and ~v
(n)
2 in B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A that are linearly independent. Together with
(23) in Lemma 4, this implies that dim
(
B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A
)
= 1. The lemma is proved.
Theorem 7. For each wiretap set A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, define a set of row ω-vectors as follows:
ΓA =
{
~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
∈ Fωq :
ω∑
i=1
αici =
∑
e∈A
βefe,n+1, where
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
∈ Fωq
and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fr+1q s.t.
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e 6= ~0
}
,
(33)
where fe,n+1 is the last component of the global encoding kernel ~f
(n+1)
e . Then for any row ω-vector
~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
∈ Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA, the following are satisfied:
• the column (n+ 1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent;
• B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1.
Remark 8. In the definition of ΓA in (33), by virtue of Lemma 6, there always exist
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
∈ Fωq
and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fr+1q that satisfy the required condition. Then for any given such
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
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and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
, there always exists ~c ∈ Fωq satisfying
∑ω
i=1 αici =
∑
e∈A βefe,n+1. Therefore, ΓA is
always nonempty.
Proof of Theorem 7: First, the ω column n-vectors ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent, and so
are the ω column (n+1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, for any row ω-vector ~c = (c1 c2 · · · cω)
in Fωq . Thus, we obtain
dim
(
B(n)ω
)
= dim
(
B(n+1)ω
)
. (34)
Let A be an arbitrary wiretap set in A˜ ′′r+1. By the definition (cf. (21)), we have dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
= |A|.
This implies
dim
(
L
(n+1)
A
)
= dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
= r + 1, (35)
or equivalently, ~f
(n+1)
e , e ∈ A are linearly independent. By (34) and (35), we see that
dim
(
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A
)
= dim
(
B(n+1)ω
)
+ dim
(
L
(n+1)
A
)
− dim
(
B(n+1)ω + L
(n+1)
A
)
≤ dim
(
B(n)ω
)
+ dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
− dim
(
B(n)ω + L
(n)
A
)
= dim
(
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A
)
= 1, (36)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 6.
Let ~v (n) be any nonzero column n-vector in B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A . It then follows from Lemma 6 that
B(n)ω
⋂
L
(n)
A =
{
γ~v (n), γ ∈ Fq
}
. (37)
Next, we will prove the claim that dim
(
B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A
)
= 1 if and only if the vector ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
satisfies
ω∑
i=1
αici =
∑
e∈A
βefe,n+1, (38)
where
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
are two nonzero row vectors over Fq such that
~v (n) =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e . (39)
For the “if” part, since ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent and
~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A are also linearly
independent (because A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1), it follows from (39) that the vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
are unique. Let v ∈ Fq be the common value of both sides of (38). Then by combining (39) and (38),
we have
~0 6=
~v (n)
v
 = ω∑
i=1
αi
~b (n)i
ci
 =∑
e∈A
βe
 ~f (n)e
fe,n+1
 ,
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which immediately implies dim
(
B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A
)
≥ 1. Together with (36), it follows that
dim
(
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A
)
= 1.
For the “only if” part, since dim
(
B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A
)
= 1, we let
~0 6= ~u (n+1) ,
~u (n)
un+1
 ∈ B(n+1)ω ⋂L(n+1)A ,
where ~u (n) is a column n-vector and un+1 is an element in Fq. Then, there exist unique vectors
(
α′i, 1 ≤
i ≤ ω
)
and
(
β′e, e ∈ A
)
, both nonzero, such that
~u (n+1) =
ω∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n+1)
i =
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n+1)e ,
or equivalently,
~u (n) =
ω∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n)e , (40)
and
un+1 =
ω∑
i=1
α′ici =
∑
e∈A
β′efe,n+1. (41)
From (40), since ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω is linearly independent and
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
is a nonzero vector, it
follows that ~u (n) 6= ~0 and ~u (n) ∈ B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A . Thus, we have ~u
(n) = γ~v (n) for some γ ∈ Fq \ {0}.
Together with (39), we further have
~u (n) = γ~v (n) =
ω∑
i=1
γαi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
γβe ~f
(n)
e . (42)
Upon comparing (40) and (42), we obtain(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
= γ
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
(43)
and (
β′e, e ∈ A
)
= γ
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
. (44)
Thus, from (43), (44), and the second equality in (41), we obtain (38), proving the “only if” part of the
claim.
Next, we define a set of row ω-vectors associated with each nonzero vector ~v (n) in B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A as
follows:
ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
=
{
~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
∈ Fωq :
ω∑
i=1
αici =
∑
e∈A
βefe,n+1, where
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
∈ Fωq
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and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fr+1q s.t. ~v
(n) =
ω∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e 6= ~0
}
. (45)
Then, in light of (36), the foregoing claim is equivalent to
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A 6= {
~0} ⇐⇒ ~c ∈ ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
. (46)
Since the LHS above does not depend on ~v (n), we see immediately that ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
also does not depend
on ~v (n). Upon noting by (33) that
ΓA =
⋃
~v (n)∈B(n)ω
⋂
L(n)A \{~0}
ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
, (47)
we obtain that
ΓA = ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
, (48)
where ~v (n) is any vector in B
(n)
ω
⋂
L
(n)
A \ {
~0}. Hence, (46) is equivalent to
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A 6= {
~0} ⇐⇒ ~c ∈ ΓA,
or equivalently,
B(n+1)ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A = {
~0} ⇐⇒ ~c ∈ Fωq \ ΓA.
Based on the above, the theorem can be proved immediately by considering all wiretap sets A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1.
By combining Theorems 5 and 7, we present the following theorem which gives the prescription for
designing the vector ~c for Ar+1.
Theorem 9. Let Fq be a finite field of order q > |A˜
′′
r+1|. Then the set F
ω
q \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA is nonempty,
and for any ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
in this set, the following are satisfied:
• the column (n+ 1)-vectors ~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, are linearly independent;
• B
(n+1)
ω
⋂
L
(n+1)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar+1.
Proof: We only need prove that if q > |A˜ ′′r+1|, then F
ω
q \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA is nonempty. The rest of the
theorem follows immediately from Theorems 5 and 7.
Let A be an arbitrary wiretap set in A˜ ′′r+1. By the proof of Theorem 7, we have ΓA = ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
(cf. (48)) for any nonzero vector ~v (n) ∈ B
(n)
ω ∩ L
(n)
A . By the uniqueness of the vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
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and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
in (39) for a fixed ~v (n), we further have |ΓA| =
∣∣ΓA(~v (n))∣∣ = qω−1 from (38). So, if
q > |A˜ ′′r+1|, we obtain∣∣∣∣Fωq \ ⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣Fωq ∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ ⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA
∣∣∣∣ ≥ qω − ∑
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
|ΓA|
= qω − qω−1
∣∣A˜ ′′r+1∣∣ = qω−1(q − ∣∣A˜ ′′r+1∣∣) > 0.
The theorem is proved.
Based on Theorem 9, for any vector ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
in Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA, we let
~b
(n+1)
i =
~b (n)i
ci
 , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, ~b (n+1)i =
~b (n)i
0
 , ω + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ~b (n+1)n+1 =
~0
1
 .
Then we let
Q(n+1) ,
[
~b
(n+1)
1
~b
(n+1)
2 · · ·
~b
(n+1)
n
~b
(n+1)
n+1
]
,
which is an (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix. Consider
Rank(Q(n+1)) = Rank
~b (n)1 · · · ~b (n)ω ~b (n)ω+1 · · · ~b (n)n ~0
c1 · · · cω 0 · · · 0 1

= Rank
~b (n)1 · · · ~b (n)ω ~b (n)ω+1 · · · ~b (n)n ~0
c1 · · · cω 0 · · · 0 1
 ·
In ~0
−~c 1

= Rank
~b (n)1 · · · ~b (n)ω ~b (n)ω+1 · · · ~b (n)n ~0
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1
 (49)
= Rank
Q(n) ~0
~0⊤ 1
 = n+ 1, (50)
where the equality (49) follows because
In ~0
−~c 1
 is unit lower triangular and hence invertible, and the
equality (50) follows from
Rank(Q(n)) = Rank
([
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
])
= n.
In other words, Q(n+1) is full rank. Then, (Q(n+1))−1 · Cn+1 is an (n + 1)-dimensional SLNC which
not only retains the fixed rate ω and achieves the higher security level r+1, but also has the same local
encoding kernels as the original n-dimensional SLNC (Q(n))−1 · Cn at all the non-source nodes.
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B. An Algorithm for Code Construction
In the last subsection, we presented an approach for designing a family of local-encoding-preserving
SLNCs for a fixed information rate and multiple security levels. In particular, Theorem 9 gives the
prescription for designing an appropriate vector ~c which is crucial for constructing a local-encoding-
preserving SLNC at one security level higher. However, Theorem 9 does not provide a method to find ~c
readily. This is tackled in Algorithm 1, which gives a polynomial-time implementation for constructing
an (n+1)-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level r+1 (here n = ω+r) from an n-dimensional
SLNC with rate ω and security level r, where the (n+1)-dimensional SLNC has the same local encoding
kernels as the original n-dimensional SLNC at all the non-source nodes. Starting from r = 0, by applying
Algorithm 1 repeatedly, we can obtain a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with a fixed rate ω
and security levels from 0 to Cmin − ω. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1.
r
0
ω
Cmin
Cminω
Fig. 1: Local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed rate and a flexible security level.
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Algorithm 1: Construction of a rate-ω and security-level-(r+ 1) SLNC from a rate-ω and security-
level-r SLNC, both of which have the same local encoding kernels at all the non-source nodes.
Let Cn and Cn+1 be linear network codes defined in Lemma 1 with q >
∣∣A˜ ′′r+1∣∣.
Input: An invertible n× n matrix Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
over Fq such that (Q
(n))−1 · Cn is an n-dimensional
SLNC with rate ω and security level r, where n = ω + r < Cmin.
Output: An invertible (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix Q(n+1) such that (Q(n+1))−1 · Cn+1 is an (n+ 1)-dimensional SLNC
with rate ω and security level r + 1.
begin
1 Set A = ∅ and ~c ∗ =
(
c∗1 c
∗
2 · · · c
∗
ω
)
= ~0;
2 for each A ∈ Ar+1 do
3 find a nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
for
∑ω
i=1 αA,i
~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e ;
// By Lemma 10, there always exists such a nonzero solution.
4 if
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 then // By Lemma 10,
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 ⇔ A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1.
5 compute λA =
∑
e∈A
βefe,n+1;
6 save the pair
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
and λA; // for the use in subsequent iterations of the “for” loop
7 compute τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i ;
8 if τA = 0 then // Obtain a new ~c
∗ s.t.
∑ω
i=1 αB,i c
∗
i 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A ∪ {A}.
9 find ~hA =
(
hA,1 hA,2 · · · hA,ω
)
∈ Fωq such that πA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i hA,i 6= 0;
10 if A = ∅ then
11 set ~c ∗ = ~hA;
else
12 compute τB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i c
∗
i and πB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i hA,i, ∀B ∈ A ;
//
(
αB,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
, B ∈ A have been saved in Line 6 in previous iterations of the “for” loop.
// τB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i c
∗
i 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A from the last iteration of the “for” loop.
13 choose ξ ∈ Fq such that ξ · τB + πB 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A ;
14 replace ~c ∗ by ξ~c ∗ + ~hA; // For the updated ~c
∗, τA 6= 0 and τB 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A .
end
end
15 add A into A ; // Update A . Then τB 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A .
end
end
// After the “for” loop, A = A˜ ′′r+1 and ~c
∗ satisfies τA 6= 0, ∀ A ∈ A = A˜
′′
r+1.
16 choose an element θ in Fq such that θ · τA 6= λA, ∀ A ∈ A ;
17 calculate ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
= θ
(
c∗1 c
∗
2 · · · c
∗
ω
)
= θ~c ∗;
// θ · τA 6= λA, ∀A ∈ A ⇒
∑ω
i=1 αA,i ci 6= λA, ∀A ∈ A˜
′′
r+1.
// This ensures that ~c ∈ Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′
r+1
ΓA.
18 let ~b
(n+1)
i =

~b (n)i
ci

, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, ~b (n+1)i =

~b (n)i
0

, ω + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ~b (n+1)n+1 =

~0
1

;
19 return Q(n+1) =
[
~b
(n+1)
1
~b
(n+1)
2 · · ·
~b
(n+1)
n+1
]
.
end
November 9, 2018 DRAFT
22
Verification of Algorithm 1:
For the purpose of verifying Algorithm 1, it suffices to verify that the vector ~c =
(
c1 c2 · · · cω
)
obtained in Line 17 satisfies that ~c ∈ Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA. First, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let A be any wiretap set in Ar+1. Then there always exists a nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤
i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn+1q for the equation
ω∑
i=1
αA,i~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e , (51)
and (
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 ⇐⇒ A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1. (52)
Proof: The equation (51) can be written as the following system of linear equations[
~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω,
~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A
]
·
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, −βe, e ∈ A
)⊤
= ~0. (53)
In view of the matrix on the LHS of the above equation of size n × (n + 1), (53) contains n linear
equations and n+ 1 variables (i.e., αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω and βe, e ∈ A), which implies that there must exist
nonzero solutions for (53), or equivalently, (51).
We now prove the “only if” part of (52). Let
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
be a nonzero solution with(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 for (51). Together with the linear independence of ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, we have
~0 6=
ω∑
i=1
αA,i~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e .
This immediately implies that B
(n)
ω ∩ L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}, proving that A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1 by Lemma 4.
To prove the “if” part of (52), we assume the contrary that for a wiretap set A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, there exists
a nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
but
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
= ~0 for the equation (51). Thus,
we see that
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
6= ~0. Together with the linear independence of ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A (by the definition of
A˜
′′
r+1 in (21)), we obtain that
∑
e∈A βe
~f
(n)
e 6= ~0. On the other hand, we have
∑ω
i=1 αA,i
~b
(n)
i =
~0 because(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
= ~0. This immediately contradicts the assumption that
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
is a solution for (51). This lemma is proved.
By Lemma 10, it follows from Lines 3, 4, and 15 that after the “for” loop (Lines 2–15), the output
set A is equal to A˜ ′′r+1. Next, we will verify by induction that after every iteration for a wiretap set
A ∈ Ar+1 (Lines 3–15), the condition
τB =
ω∑
i=1
αB,i c
∗
i 6= 0, ∀ B ∈ A (54)
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is satisfied for the updated ~c ∗ and the updated A . Then, upon completion of the “for” loop, with
A = A˜ ′′r+1, this implies that the vector ~c
∗ satisfies
τA =
ω∑
i=1
αA,i c
∗
i 6= 0, ∀ A ∈ A˜
′′
r+1. (55)
First, we note that the condition (54) is satisfied for A = ∅ and ~c ∗ = ~0. Assume that (54) is satisfied
after a number of iterations of the “for” loop, with at least one wiretap set A ∈ Ar+1 that has not been
processed. In the next iteration, one such A is processed. At this point, the set A contains the wiretap
sets B in A˜ ′′r+1 that have already been processed in the previous iterations.
Case 1: For the wiretap set A, if the nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
of the equation (51)
found in Line 3 satisfies
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
= ~0 (i.e., A ∈ A˜ ′r+1 by Lemma 10), the “if” statement
(Lines 4–15) is not executed. Then, the vector ~c ∗ and the set A are unchanged, so that by the induction
hypothesis, the condition (54) is satisfied.
Case 2: Otherwise, we let
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
with
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 be the nonzero
solution of the equation (51) found in Line 3 (i.e., A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1 by Lemma 10). For this case, the “if”
statement (Lines 4–15) is executed. Then, we compute τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i and consider the following
two subcases.
Case 2A: τA 6= 0.
The second “if” statement (Lines 8–14) is not executed, so that the vector ~c ∗ is unchanged. By Line 15,
the set A is updated by including A. Combining τA 6= 0 and the induction hypothesis, (54) is satisfied
for the unchanged vector ~c ∗ and the updated set A .
Case 2B: τA = 0.
The second “if” statement (Lines 8–14) is executed. Then, we find ~hA =
(
hA,1 hA,2 · · · hA,ω
)
∈ Fωq
such that πA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i hA,i 6= 0 in Line 9. If A = ∅ (Line 10), then for this wiretap set A,
Algorithm 1 finds a nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
of
∑ω
i=1 αA,i
~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A βe
~f
(n)
e
with
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 for the first time. On the other hand, ~c ∗ = ~0, the initial value, so that
τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i = 0. Then, we update ~c
∗ = ~hA in Line 11 and update A from ∅ to {A} in Line 15.
Now, we have
τA =
ω∑
i=1
αA,i c
∗
i =
ω∑
i=1
αA,i hA,i = πA 6= 0.
In other words, after this iteration for A, the condition (54) holds for the updated ~c ∗ (= ~hA) and the
updated A (= {A}).
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Otherwise, i.e., A 6= ∅. We compute τB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i c
∗
i and πB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i hA,i for all B ∈ A
in Line 12. By Line 13, we choose ξ ∈ Fq such that ξ · τB + πB 6= 0, ∀B ∈ A , which is equivalent to
choosing
ξ ∈ Fq \
⋃
B∈A
{
−
πB
τB
}
,
where we note that τB 6= 0 for each B ∈ A by the induction hypothesis. This immediately implies
that the field size q > |A˜ ′′r+1| ≥ |A | is sufficient for the existence of such a ξ. Now, we update ~c
∗ to
ξ~c ∗ + ~hA in Line 14. For the wiretap sets B in A , it follows from Line 13 that
ω∑
i=1
αB,i · (ξc
∗
i + hA,i) = ξ ·
ω∑
i=1
αB,i c
∗
i +
ω∑
i=1
αB,i hA,i = ξ · τB + πB 6= 0,
and for the wiretap set A, it follows from τA = 0 and Line 8 that
ω∑
i=1
αA,i · (ξc
∗
i + hA,i) = ξ ·
ω∑
i=1
αA,i c
∗
i +
ω∑
i=1
αA,i hA,i = ξ · τA + πA = πA 6= 0.
Thus, for this updated vector ~c ∗ (i.e., ξ~c ∗ + ~hA) and the updated A that includes A, (54) is satisfied.
Therefore, we have verified that after every iteration of the “for” loop (Lines 3–15), the condition
(54) is satisfied for the updated ~c ∗ and the updated A . Finally, we verify that the vector ~c obtained
in Lines 16 and 17 satisfies ~c ∈ Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA. Let A be an arbitrary wiretap set in A˜
′′
r+1, and(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
with
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 be the solution found in Line 3. Let
~v (n) =
ω∑
i=1
αA,i~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e , (56)
where we note that ~v (n) is a nonzero vector because
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 and ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω are
linearly independent. Together with the linear independence of ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A (by the definition of A˜ ′′r+1
in (21)), for ~v (n) in (56), both
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
∈ Fωq and
(
βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fr+1q are unique. Consequently,
by ΓA = ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
(cf. (48)) and the definition of ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
(cf. (45)), we obtain that
~c ∈ Fωq \ ΓA ⇐⇒ ~c ∈ F
ω
q \ ΓA
(
~v (n)
)
⇐⇒
ω∑
i=1
αA,i ci 6=
∑
e∈A
βefe,n+1 = λA,
where the RHS is exactly the requirement in Line 16 (with ~c = θ · ~c ∗). Thus, we have verified that the
vector ~c obtained in Line 17 satisfies that ~c ∈ Fωq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
ΓA.
It remains to verify the existence of such an element θ in Line 16. For each A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, we have
verified that τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i 6= 0 (cf. (55)). Thus, in order to choose θ ∈ Fq satisfying θ · τA 6= λA
for all A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, it is equivalent to choosing θ ∈ Fq \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′r+1
{
λA · τ
−1
A
}
. This immediately implies
that the field size q > |A˜ ′′r+1| is sufficient for the existence of such a θ.
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v1 v2
v3
v4
t1 t2
e2 e3
e5
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e8e9
e10 e11
e1 e4
Fig. 2: The network G = (V,E).
Next, we give an example to illustrate Algorithm 1, in which the same setup as in Example 1 in [1]
is used.
Example 1. We consider the network G = (V,E) depicted in Fig. 2. Let
C3 =
{
Ks =
[
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 2 2
]
, K1 = K2 = K4 = [ 1 1 ] , K3 =
[
4
1
]}
(57)
be a 3-dimensional linear network code over the field F5 on G, where Ki represents the local encoding
kernels at the intermediate nodes vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. As defined in Lemma 1,
C2 =
[
I2 ~0
]
· C3 =
{[
I2 ~0
]
·Ks = [ 0 1 1 01 0 0 1 ] , K1 = K2 = K4 = [ 1 1 ] , K3 =
[
4
1
]}
is a local-encoding-preserving 2-dimensional linear network code C2 over F5, of which all the global
encoding kernels ~f
(2)
i for ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 11, are
~f
(2)
1 =
[
0
1
]
, ~f
(2)
2 =
~f
(2)
5 =
~f
(2)
6 =
[
1
0
]
, ~f
(2)
3 =
~f
(2)
7 =
~f
(2)
8 =
[
1
0
]
,
~f
(2)
4 =
[
0
1
]
, ~f
(2)
9 =
~f
(2)
10 =
~f
(2)
11 =
[
0
0
]
.
Let ω = 1 be the fixed rate. We first consider the security level r = 1, and the set of the primary edge
subsets of size 1 is
A1 =
{
{e1}, {e2}, {e3}, {e4}, {e9}
}
. (58)
Let Q(2) =
[
~b
(2)
1
~b
(2)
2
]
=
[
1 1
1 0
]
be a 2×2 invertible matrix over F5. It can be verified that (Q
(2))−1 · C2
is a 2-dimensional SLNC with rate 1 and security level 1.
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In the following, we will use Algorithm 1 to construct a local-encoding-preserving 3-dimensional SLNC
for the fixed rate 1 and a higher security level 2. First, we give the set of the primary edge subsets of
size 2 as follows:
A2 =
{
{e1, e2}, {e1, e3}, {e1, e4}, {e1, e9}, {e2, e3}, {e2, e4}, {e3, e4}, {e4, e9}
}
. (59)
With ~b
(2)
1 =
[
1
1
]
, there exists a solution (αA,1, βe, e ∈ A) of αA,1~b
(2)
1 =
∑
e∈A βe
~f
(2)
e with αA,1 6= 0
(cf. Line 3) if and only if ~b
(2)
1 ∈ L
(2)
A . Thus, after finishing the “for” loop, the output A contains the
primary edge subsets A ∈ A2 satisfying ~b
(2)
1 ∈ L
(2)
A , i.e., A =
{
{e1, e2}, {e1, e3}, {e2, e4}, {e3, e4}
}
(we can verify that A = A˜ ′′2 ), and for each A ∈ A ,
L
(2)
A =
〈
~f (2)e : e ∈ A
〉
=
〈[
1
0
]
,
[
0
1
]〉
.
In the sequel, we use {i, j} to represent an edge subset {ei, ej} for notational simplicity. Then, we
find (α1 = 1, βi = βj = 1), which is a nonzero solution of α1~b
(2)
1 = βi
~f
(2)
i + βj
~f
(2)
j (cf. Line 3)
for each {i, j} ∈ A˜ ′′2 . We compute λ{i,j} = βifi,3 + βjfj,3 (cf. Line 5) for all {i, j} ∈ A˜
′′
2 to obtain
λ{1,2} = 2, λ{1,3} = λ{2,4} = 3, and λ{3,4} = 4. According to the “for” loop of Algorithm 1, we can
obtain ~c ∗ = c∗1 = 2 that satisfies τA = α1c
∗
1 = 2 6= 0, ∀A ∈ A˜
′′
2 . In Line 16, we choose θ = 3 such that
θ · α1c
∗
1 = 1 6= λ{i,j}, ∀ {i, j} ∈ A˜
′′
2 , and then in Line 17 we calculate ~c = c1 = θ · c
∗
1 = 1. In fact, we
can calculate Γ{1,2} = {2}, Γ{1,3} = Γ{2,4} = {3}, and Γ{3,4} = {4} by (33), and thus we can verify
that
~c = 1 ∈ F5 \
⋃
A∈A˜ ′′2
ΓA = {0, 1}.
Finally, in Lines 18 and 19, respectively, we let ~b
(3)
1 =
[
1
1
1
]
, ~b
(3)
2 =
[
1
0
0
]
, and ~b
(3)
3 =
[
0
0
1
]
and output the
3× 3 invertible matrix Q(3) =
[
~b
(3)
1
~b
(3)
2
~b
(3)
3
]
. Then (Q(3))−1 · C3 is a 3-dimensional SLNC with rate
1 and security level 2 which has the same local encoding kernels as the SLNC (Q(2))−1 · C2 at all the
intermediate nodes.
Field Size of Algorithm 1:
By the forgoing verification of Algorithm 1, a finite field Fq with q >
∣∣∣A˜ ′′r+1∣∣∣ is sufficient for
constructing the matrix Q(n+1). Therefore, for the fixed rate ω, the field size
q > max
{∣∣∣T ∣∣∣, ∣∣∣A˜ ′′r ∣∣∣, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − ω}5 (60)
is sufficient for constructing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the fixed rate ω and
security levels from 0 to Cmin − ω.
5The reason for requiring q > |T | here is to guarantee the existence of a Cmin-dimensional linear network code CCmin on G.
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In addition, for a security level r, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin− ω, we note that max
{
|T |, |Ar|
}
is the best known
lower bound on the required field size for the existence of an SLNC with rate ω and security level r
(cf. [2]). Together with
∣∣∣Ar∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣A˜ ′′r ∣∣∣ for each 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − ω, we thus see that there is no penalty
at all on the field size (in terms of the best known lower bound) for constructing such a family of
local-encoding-preserving SLNCs. Upon comparing with the required field size
q > max
{∣∣T ∣∣, ∣∣Ar∣∣, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − ω}
of the approach proposed at the beginning of Section III for constructing such a family of local-encoding-
preserving SLNCs, by (60) we see that our approach here requires a field with a smaller size.
Complexity of Algorithm 1:
For the purpose of determining the computational complexity of Algorithm 1, we do not differentiate an
addition from a multiplication over a finite field, although in general the time needed for a multiplication
is much longer than that needed for an addition. We further assume that the computational complexity
of each operation, i.e., an addition or a multiplication, is O(1) regardless of the finite field.
Now, we discuss the complexity of Algorithm 1.
• In Line 3, for each wiretap set A ∈ Ar+1, we can find a nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈
A
)
∈ Fn+1q of the equation
∑ω
i=1 αA,i
~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A βe
~f
(n)
e by solving the system of linear equations[
~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω,
~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A
]
·
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, −βe, e ∈ A
)⊤
= ~0,
which takes at most O
(
n3
)
operations by Gaussian elimination.
• In view of the nonzero solution
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω, βe, e ∈ A
)
with
(
αA,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
)
6= ~0 for
a wiretap set A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1, we compute λA =
∑
e∈A βefe,n+1 in Line 5 and τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i in
Line 7, which take at most O
(
r + 1
)
operations and O
(
ω
)
operations, respectively.
• For Line 9, to find ~hA =
(
hA,1 hA,2 · · · hA,ω
)
∈ Fωq such that πA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i hA,i 6= 0, it
suffices to take hA,i = 1 for some i with αA,i 6= 0, and hA,j = 0 for other 1 ≤ j ≤ ω and j 6= i.
Thus, the calculation of πB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i hA,i for a wiretap set B ∈ A in Line 12 takes O
(
1
)
operations. Further, the calculation of τB =
∑ω
i=1 αB,i c
∗
i for a wiretap set B ∈ A in Line 12 takes
O
(
ω
)
operations.
• Based on the above analyses, the complexity of Line 13, i.e., choosing ξ ∈ Fq such that ξ·τB+πB 6= 0
for all B ∈ A , is at most O
(
ω|A |
)
.
• For Line 14, the calculation of the vector ξ~c ∗ + ~hA takes at most O
(
ω
)
operations.
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• For the “for” loop (Lines 2–15), the worst case in terms of the complexity is that τA = 0 for each
execution of the “if” condition (Line 8) with respect to a wiretap set A ∈ A˜ ′′r+1. Combining the
forgoing analyses, the total complexity of the “for” loop is at most O
(
n3|Ar+1|+ ω
∑|A˜ ′′r+1|−1
i=1 1
)
.
• For Line 16, with the calculation of τA =
∑ω
i=1 αA,i c
∗
i taking O
(
ω
)
operations, the complexity of
choosing θ ∈ Fq such that θ · τA 6= λA for all A ∈ A˜
′′
r+1 is at most O
(
ω|A˜ ′′r+1|
)
.
• For Line 17, the calculation of ~c = θ~c ∗ takes at most O
(
ω
)
operations.
Therefore, by combining all the foregoing analyses, the total complexity of Algorithm 1 is not larger
than
O
(
n3|Ar+1|+ ω|A˜
′′
r+1|
2
)
.
With this complexity, we see that the complexity of Algorithm 1 even for the worst case is considerably
smaller than one ωth of the complexity
O
(
ωn3
∣∣Ar+1∣∣+ ωn∣∣Ar+1∣∣2 + (r + 1)n3)
(cf. the 3th footnote or Appendix A in [1]) of the approach proposed at the beginning of Section III.
On the other hand, for our approach here, in order to store the matrix Q(n+1) at the source node s, it
suffices to store the row ω-vector ~c only. This implies that the storage cost is O
(
ω
)
, which is independent
of the dimensions of linear network codes and considerably smaller than the storage cost O
(
(n + 1)2
)
of the approach proposed at the beginning of Section III. Thus, our approach here reduces considerably
the complexity and storage cost further.
IV. FIXED-DIMENSION SECURE NETWORK CODING
In this section, we consider the problem of designing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with
a fixed dimension n (0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin), i.e., a family of n-dimensional local-encoding-preserving SLNCs
with the rate and security-level pair (ω, r) satisfying ω + r = n. These pairs are all the nonnegative
integer points on the line ω + r = n, as shown in Fig. 3. Note that the pair (0, r) is always achievable
for 0 ≤ r ≤ Cmin.
Based on the SLNC construction at the end of Section II, we naturally put forward the following
approach to solve this problem. First, we construct an n-dimensional linear network code Cn. With this
code Cn, for each nontrivial security level 1 ≤ r ≤ n−1, we design an n×n invertible matrix Q
(n)
r such
that the condition (4) is satisfied (here we use Q
(n)
r in place of the matrix Q(n) in the SLNC construction
at the end of Section II). Then, we obtain a family of n-dimensional local-encoding-preserving SLNCs{(
Q
(n)
r
)−1
· Cn : 0 ≤ r ≤ n− 1
}
(here Q
(n)
0 can be taken as the n× n identity matrix) with rate and
security-level pairs (n − r, r) for 0 ≤ r ≤ n − 1. However, the above approach not only requires the
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r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
n
n
Fig. 3: SLNCs with a fixed dimension n, 1 ≤ n ≤ Cmin.
construction of the matrix Q
(n)
r for each r but also requires the source node s to store all the matrices
Q
(n)
r . To avoid these shortcomings, we present the following more efficient approach to construct an
n-dimensional SLNC such that with the same SLNC, all the pairs (ω, r) on the line ω + r = n can be
achieved. The next theorem asserts the existence of such an SLNC.
Theorem 11. Let n be a nonnegative integer with n ≤ Cmin, and Cn be an n-dimensional linear network
code on the network G over a finite field Fq with
q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 1
}
,
of which all the global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. Then, there exists an n × n invertible matrix
Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
over Fq such that for each 0 ≤ r ≤ n, the following condition is satisfied:〈
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
n−r
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar.
6 (61)
In other words, (Q(n))−1 · Cn is an Fq-valued n-dimensional SLNC applicable to any rate and security-
level pair (n− r, r) for r = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n.
Proof: If there exists an n× n invertible matrix Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
over Fq satisfying
the condition (61) for each 0 ≤ r ≤ n, then by Lemma 2, (Q(n))−1 · Cn is an Fq-valued n-dimensional
SLNC applicable to any rate and security-level pair (n− r, r) for 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Thus, it remains to prove
6For notational convenience, we let A0 = ∅ and
{
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
i
}
= ∅ for i = 0. Then, the condition (61) is always
satisfied for r = 0 and r = n.
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that if q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ n − 1
}
, there exists such an n × n invertible matrix Q(n) over
Fq. Toward this end, we choose the n vectors ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
n sequentially such that the following
is satisfied:
~b
(n)
i ∈ F
n
q \
⋃
A∈An−i
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (62)
Then we prove that Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
satisfies the condition (61).
We first prove that all the sets on the RHS of (62) are nonempty provided that q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤
r ≤ n− 1
}
. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we consider∣∣∣∣Fnq \ ⋃
A∈An−i
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Fnq ∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ ⋃
A∈An−i
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)∣∣∣∣
≥ qn −
∑
A∈An−i
∣∣∣B(n)i−1 + L(n)A ∣∣∣
≥ qn −
∑
A∈An−i
qn−1
= qn−1(q − |An−i|) > 0,
where the last inequality follows because for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and A ∈ An−i,
dim
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)
≤ dim
(
B
(n)
i−1
)
+ dim
(
L
(n)
A
)
= i− 1 + n− i = n− 1.
Now, by (62), we see that
~b
(n)
1 6= ~0 and
~b
(n)
i ∈ F
n
q \ B
(n)
i−1, 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
which immediately implies that ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n are linearly independent. Next, we will prove that for
each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the condition〈
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
i
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ An−i,
i.e.,
B
(n)
i
⋂
L
(n)
A = {
~0}, ∀ A ∈ An−i (63)
is satisfied, which is equivalent to (61) by taking r = n− i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The condition (63) is clearly
satisfied for i = 0 and i = n. It remains to prove that (63) is satisfied for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, which will be
done by induction as follows.
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We now assume that (63) is satisfied for i−1 and will prove that (63) is satisfied for i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1.
Suppose the contrary that (63) is not satisfied for i, namely that there exists a wiretap set A in An−i
such that B
(n)
i
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}. Then there exist two nonzero vectors
(
αj, 1 ≤ j ≤ i
)
∈ Fiq and
(
βe, e ∈
A
)
∈ Fn−iq such that
~0 6=
i∑
j=1
αj~b
(n)
j =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e , (64)
where in the above
∑i
j=1 αj
~b
(n)
j 6=
~0 because ~b
(n)
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ i are linearly independent. We first claim
that αi = 0 because otherwise
~b
(n)
i = (αi)
−1 ·
(∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e −
i−1∑
j=1
αj~b
(n)
j
)
∈ B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A ,
contradicting the condition (62) that must be satisfied by ~b
(n)
i . For i = 1, we have α1 = 0 which
contradicts that
(
α1
)
is a nonzero vector. This proves (63) for i = 1. For i ≥ 2, we can rewrite (64) as
~0 6=
i−1∑
j=1
αj~b
(n)
j =
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n)
e ,
implying that
B
(n)
i−1
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}. (65)
Let e ∈ E be an edge not in A. Such an edge e exists since |E| ≥ Cmin ≥ n > n − i = |A| for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Then we have
A ∪ {e} ∈ En−(i−1) =
{
A ⊆ E : |A| ≤ n− (i− 1)
}
and B
(n)
i−1
⋂
L
(n)
A
⋃
{e} 6= {
~0} by (65). By Lemma 3, there must exist a wiretap set A′ ∈ An−(i−1) such that
B
(n)
i−1
⋂
L
(n)
A′ 6= {
~0}, which is a contradiction to the induction hypothesis that (63) is satisfied for i − 1.
This proves that (63) is satisfied for i, and the theorem follows.
Algorithm 2 is an implementation for the construction of the SLNC in the proof of Theorem 11. We
note that max
{
|T |, |Ar|
}
is the best known lower bound on the required field size for the existence of an
SLNC with security level r (cf. [2]). Thus, for Algorithm 2, there is no penalty on the field size (in terms
of the best known lower bound) for constructing such an SLNC applicable to all rate and security-level
pairs (ω, r) with ω + r = n.
Next, we discuss the complexity of Algorithm 2. Similar to the previous complexity analyses, we do
not differentiate an addition from a multiplication over a finite field, and instead we assume that the
computational complexity of each operation is O(1) regardless of the finite field. In Lines 1 and 2, the
vector ~b
(n)
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 can be found in time O
(
n3
∣∣An−i∣∣ + n∣∣An−i∣∣2), and the vector ~b (n)n in
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Algorithm 2: Construction of an n-dimensional SLNC applicable to all rate and security-level pairs
(ω, r) with ω + r = n.
Input: An n-dimensional linear network code Cn over a finite field Fq with
q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 1
}
.
Output: An n× n invertible matrix Q(n) such that (Q(n))−1 · Cn is an n-dimensional SLNC
applicable to all rate and security-level pairs (ω, r) with ω + r = n.
begin
1 choose ~b
(n)
1 ∈ F
n
q \
⋃
A∈An−1
L
(n)
A ;
for i = 2 to n− 1 do
2 choose ~b
(n)
i ∈ F
n
q \
⋃
A∈An−i
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)
;
end
3 choose ~b
(n)
n ∈ Fnq \ B
(n)
n−1;
4 return Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
.
end
Line 3 can be found in at most O
(
n3+n
)
operations (cf. the complexity analysis of Line 3 in Algorithm 1
in [1] or Appendix A in [1]). Combining the above analyses, the total complexity of Algorithm 2 is thus
at most
O
(
n3
(
1 +
n−1∑
i=1
∣∣An−i∣∣)+ n(1 + n−1∑
i=1
∣∣An−i∣∣2)
)
. (66)
For the approach proposed at the beginning of this section, we note that the computational complexity
of the construction of Q
(n)
r is O
(
(n−r)n3|Ar|+(n−r)n|Ar|
2+rn2
)
for 1 ≤ r ≤ n−1 (cf. Appendix A
in [1]), and thus the total complexity of the construction of all the n− 1 matrices Q
(n)
r , 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 1 is
O
(
n3
(
n+
n−1∑
r=1
(n− r)
∣∣Ar∣∣)+ n(n+ n−1∑
r=1
(n− r)
∣∣Ar∣∣2)
)
,
or equivalently,
O
(
n3
(
n+
n−1∑
i=1
i
∣∣An−i∣∣)+ n(n+ n−1∑
i=1
i
∣∣An−i∣∣2)
)
. (67)
Comparing (66) and (67), we see that the complexity of Algorithm 2 is considerably smaller than that
of the approach proposed at the beginning of this section. On the other hand, for our approach here,
it suffices to store the matrix Q(n) only at the source node s, which implies that the storage cost is at
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most O
(
n2
)
. This is also considerably smaller than the storage cost O
(
n3
)
of the approach proposed at
the beginning of this section that needs to store all the matrices Q
(n)
r , 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
We continue to use the setup in Example 1 to illustrate Algorithm 2.
Example 2. We consider the network G (cf. Fig. 2) and the 3-dimensional F5-valued linear network code
C3 (cf. (57)) in Example 1. Next, we use Algorithm 2 to construct a 3-dimensional SLNC (Q
(3))−1 · C3
achieving all 4 rate and security-level pairs (3, 0), (2, 1), (1, 2) and (0, 3) on the line ω + r = 3, where
we remark that the pair (0, 3) is always achievable. For the nontrivial security levels 1 and 2, with the
linear network code C3, we calculate that
• according to the set A1 of the primary edge subsets with size 1 (cf. (58)),
L
(3)
{e1}
=
〈[
0
1
1
]〉
, L
(3)
{e2}
=
〈[
1
0
1
]〉
, L
(3)
{e3}
=
〈[
1
0
2
]〉
, L
(3)
{e4}
=
〈[
0
1
2
]〉
, L
(3)
{e9}
=
〈[
0
0
1
]〉
;
• according to the set A2 of the primary edge subsets with size 2 (cf. (59)),
L
(3)
{e1,e2}
=
〈[
0
1
1
]
,
[
1
0
1
]〉
, L
(3)
{e1,e3}
=
〈[
0
1
1
]
,
[
1
0
2
]〉
, L
(3)
{e1,e4}
= L
(3)
{e1,e9}
= L
(3)
{e4,e9}
=
〈[
0
1
1
]
,
[
0
0
1
]〉
,
L
(3)
{e2,e3}
=
〈[
1
0
1
]
,
[
0
0
1
]〉
, L
(3)
{e2,e4}
=
〈[
1
0
1
]
,
[
0
1
2
]〉
, L
(3)
{e3,e4}
=
〈[
1
0
2
]
,
[
0
1
2
]〉
.
In Lines 1–3, we sequentially choose column 3-vectors ~b
(3)
1 ,
~b
(3)
2 ,
~b
(3)
3 as follows:
~b
(3)
1 =
[
1
1
0
]
∈ F35 \
⋃
A∈A2
L
(3)
A ,
~b
(3)
2 =
[
0
1
0
]
∈ F35 \
⋃
A∈A1
(
B
(3)
1 + L
(3)
A
)
= F35 \
⋃
A∈A1
〈
~b
(3)
1 ,
~f (3)e , e ∈ A
〉
,
~b
(3)
3 =
[
0
0
1
]
∈ F35 \ B
(3)
2 = F
3
5 \
〈
~b
(3)
1 ,
~b
(3)
2
〉
,
and output the invertible Q(3) =
[
~b
(3)
1
~b
(3)
2
~b
(3)
3
]
=
[
1 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
]
. Now, (Q(3))−1 · C3 is an F5-valued
3-dimensional SLNC that is applicable to the rate and security-level pairs (2, 1) and (1, 2). Clearly,
(Q(3))−1 · C3 is also applicable to the rate and security-level pair (3, 0) by the invertibility of Q
(3) and
Proposition 1.
Theorem 11 guarantees the existence of an SLNC for the current example if
|Fq| > max
{
|T |, |A1|, |A2|
}
= 8.
However, such an SLNC may exist in a base field with size less than or equal to 8, which is the case for
the SLNC constructed here.
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V. SECURE NETWORK CODING FOR FLEXIBLE RATE AND SECURITY LEVEL
Cai and Yeung [8] have proved that there exists an n-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level
r (here n = ω+ r) on the network G if and only if ω+ r ≤ Cmin, where Cmin is the smallest minimum
cut capacity between the source node and each sink node. We say a nonnegative integer pair (ω, r) of
rate ω and security level r is achievable if ω+ r ≤ Cmin, and the set of all the achievable pairs is called
the rate and security-level region, depicted in Fig. 4. In this section, we consider the ultimate problem of
designing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a flexible rate and a flexible security level,
more precisely, a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving all achievable pairs (ω, r) in the
rate and security level region.
To solve this problem, we combine Algorithm 1 in [1] and Algorithms 1 and 2 in the current paper,
which respectively are designed to construct local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed security level
and a flexible rate, for a fixed rate and a flexible security level, and for a fixed dimension and a flexible
pair of rate and security level. By considering different combinations, we can provide multiple ways
to construct a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs such that all pairs in the rate and security-
level region are achieved. In the following, we present 3 possible constructions of such a family of
local-encoding-preserving SLNCs.
Construction 1: Start with a Cmin-dimensional linear network code CCmin . We first apply Algorithm 2
to construct a Cmin-dimensional SLNC
(
Q(Cmin)
)−1
· Cmin such that all the rate and security-level pairs
on the line ω + r = Cmin are achieved. Here, all the achievable pairs (ω, r) with ω + r = Cmin share
r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
Fig. 4: The rate and security-level region.
r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
Fig. 5: Construction 1.
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the same SLNC
(
Q(Cmin)
)−1
· Cmin and clearly the local-encoding-preserving property is guaranteed. By
Theorem 11, a field Fq of size
q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − 1
}
is sufficient for applying Algorithm 2 to construct such an SLNC.
Next, for each achievable pair (ω, r) on the line ω+ r = Cmin, we start with the SLNC
(
Q(Cmin)
)−1
·
Cmin with rate ω and security level r. Then, we apply Algorithm 1 in [1] repeatedly to construct a family
of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the fixed security level r and rates decreasing one by one
from ω to 0. It follows from Theorem 6 in [1] that a field Fq of size q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|
}
is sufficient
for applying Algorithm 1 in [1] to construct such a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs. We
remark that all the SLNCs in this family have the same local encoding kernels as
(
Q(Cmin)
)−1
· Cmin
at all the intermediate nodes. Therefore, the SLNCs in all the families with respect to distinct security
levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ Cmin share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node, namely that
all the SLNCs are local-encoding-preserving.
As such, we obtain a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving all the pairs in the rate
and security-level region. Furthermore, it follows from the above discussions that the field size∣∣Fq∣∣ > max{|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − 1} (68)
is sufficient for constructing such a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs. By (68), we see that
with this method, there is no penalty on the field size (in terms of the best known lower bound [2]) for
constructing such a family of SLNCs. Construction 1 is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Construction 2: Start with a Cmin-dimensional linear network code CCmin . We first apply Lemma 1
to construct local-encoding-preserving linear network codes Cn for 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin, and a base field Fq
of size q > |T | is sufficient (cf. [9], [10]). Thus, we have obtained a family of local-encoding-preserving
SLNCs with rate and security-level pairs (n, 0) for all 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin. These pairs are all the nonnegative
integer points on the line r = 0.
Next, for each pair (n, 0), 1 ≤ n ≤ Cmin, we start with the SLNC Cn (with the rate and security-level
pair (n, 0)). Then, we apply Algorithm 1 repeatedly to construct a family of local-encoding-preserving
SLNCs with the fixed rate n and security levels increasing one by one from 0 to Cmin−n. Note that this
construction is unnecessary for n = 0 because the pair (0, r) is always achievable for any 0 ≤ r ≤ Cmin.
It follows from Theorem 9 that a field Fq of size q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − n
}
is sufficient
for applying Algorithm 1 to construct such a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs. We note that
all the SLNCs in this family have the same local encoding kernels as Cn at all the intermediate nodes.
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r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
Fig. 6: Construction 2.
r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
Fig. 7: Construction 3.
Together with the assertion in Lemma 1 that all the linear network codes Cn, 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin share a
common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node, we see that the SLNCs in all the families with
respect to distinct rates n, 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate
node, or equivalently, all the SLNCs are local-encoding-preserving.
As such, we have obtained a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving all the pairs in the
rate and security-level region, and by the above discussions, the field size∣∣Fq∣∣ > max{|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − 1}
is sufficient. Similar to Construction 1, there is no penalty on the field size (in terms of the best known
lower bound [2]) for constructing such a family of SLNCs. Construction 2 is illustrated in Fig. 6.
Construction 3: Start with a Cmin-dimensional linear network code CCmin . Similar to Construction 2,
we first apply Lemma 1 to construct a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with rate and security-
level pairs (n, 0), 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin, where the field size |Fq| > |T | is sufficient.
Next, for each pair (n, 0), 1 ≤ n ≤ Cmin, we start with the SLNC Cn and apply Algorithm 2 to construct
an n-dimensional SLNC
(
Q(n)
)−1
· Cn achieving all the nonnegative rate and security-level pairs (ω, r)
with ω + r = n. It follows from Theorem 11 that a base field Fq of size q > max
{
|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤
n−1
}
is sufficient for applying Algorithm 2 to construct such an SLNC. Furthermore, by Proposition 1,
the SLNC
(
Q(n)
)−1
· Cn has the same local encoding kernels as Cn at all the intermediate nodes. By
Lemma 1, all Cn, 0 ≤ n ≤ Cmin share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node. We
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thus see that all the SLNCs
(
Q(n)
)−1
· Cn, 1 ≤ n ≤ Cmin share a common local encoding kernel at each
intermediate node, namely that all the SLNCs are local-encoding-preserving.
As such, we have obtained a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs achieving all the pairs in the
rate and security-level region, and by the above discussions, the field size∣∣Fq∣∣ > max{|T |, |Ar|, 1 ≤ r ≤ Cmin − 1}
is sufficient. Again, we see that no penalty on the field size (in terms of the best known lower bound [2])
exists for constructing such a family of SLNCs. Construction 3 is illustrated in Fig. 7.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Part II of a two-part paper, we continue the studies of local-encoding-preserving secure network
coding in Part I [1]. We first tackle the problem of local-encoding-preserving secure network coding for
a fixed rate and a flexible security level. We develop a novel approach for designing a family of local-
encoding-preserving SLNCs with a fixed rate and the security level ranging from 0 to the maximum
possible. Our approach, which increases the dimension of the code (equal to the sum of the rate and the
security level) step by step, is totally different from all the previous approaches for related problems
which decreases the dimension of the code. A polynomial-time algorithm is presented for efficient
implementation of our approach. We also prove that our approach does not incur any penalty on the
required field size for the existence of SLNCs in terms of the best known lower bound by Guang and
Yeung [2], and has a constant storage cost that is independent of the dimension of the SLNC.
We further tackle the problem of local-encoding-preserving secure network coding for a fixed di-
mension. We develop another novel approach for designing an SLNC that can be applied for all the
rate and security-level pairs with the fixed dimension. Clearly, the local-encoding-preserving property
is guaranteed since only one SLNC is applied for all such pairs. Based on this approach, we present a
polynomial-time algorithm for implementation and prove that there is no penalty on the required field
size for the existence of SLNCs (also in terms of the best known lower bound by Guang and Yeung [2]).
The code constructions presented in Part I and the current paper can be applied individually. At the
end of the paper, we show that by combining these constructions in suitable ways, they can be used for
solving the ultimate problem of local-encoding-preserving secure network coding for the whole rate and
security-level region.
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